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IntroductIon
 In recent years, large-scale development projects have become one of the 
most important and contested issues in the areas of business and human rights. For 
many local people living in poor countries, a large development project represents 
a potentially transformative opportunity, coming as they often do with promises of 
jobs for local people, support for schools and other social services, tax and royalty 
payments to the government, and a number of other potential benefits.1 Whether 
local people actually benefit from the project depends on a host of factors, many of
1.     See generally Int’l FIn. corp., AnnuAl report 2013 at 35−37, 43, 53 (2013) (describing 
private sector development impact on health care, improving energy efficiency, creating jobs, 
and transferring knowledge and business acumen to local businesses). See also Int’l FIn. 
corp., two GoAls—end extreme poverty, Boost shAred prosperIty 2 (2013) (describing 
private sector mining development project in Ghana financed in part by IFC as creating jobs 
for local people, helping local businesses grow, and contributing to community development); 
Bp, sustAInABIlIty revIew 2013, at 42–43 (2013) (describing the energy company BP’s 
contribution to local employment in Angola, payment of taxes and royalties to host country 
governments around the world, and promotion of good governance and social projects).
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. I am grateful to participants in the 
Symposium sponsored by the Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality at Indiana University 
Maurer School of Law and to Jennifer Robbennolt for helpful comments.
which are not within the community’s control or not susceptible to modification or
manipulation.2 One important factor that is—or should be—within the community’s
influence is the stakeholder engagement plan (SEP).3 
 When a large-scale development project comes to a poor country, that 
project typically comes with something that looks very much like its own legal 
system. This new legal system is meant to structure the relationship between those 
affected by the new project and the proponents of the project. The new rules might 
sort those affected by the project into categories, distribute economic benefits 
differentially based on those categories, allocate other benefits which can increase 
or decrease the social power of those affected, define the ways that people harmed 
by the project may seek redress for their injuries, or modify existing governance 
structures.4 Increasingly, these rules are formalized in what is often known as an 
SEP. In the past decade, through the efforts of large institutional lenders such as 
the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and an array of non-governmental 
organizations, stakeholder engagement plans have become more comprehensive 
and sensitive to the wide range of impacts that development projects can have 
on the communities in which those projects take place. Nonetheless, SEPs are 
problematic, in large part because they amount to a new legal system, plunked 
down in a community in which there already exists a formal legal system (in the 
form of national and municipal law), and the usual, non-formal mechanisms of 
addressing legal or quasi-legal issues that exist in every community. 
 Under the approach followed by the IFC, stakeholder engagement plans 
impose a highly legalized process, negotiated in reflection of prevailing domestic 
and international law, designed to implement particular policy preferences. 
Stakeholder engagement plans are designed to perform several functions that are 
important to the success of the project and to the affected community. Most SEPs 
rely on what is essentially conventional wisdom when it comes to determining how
2.     For an illustration of the many complex factors that contribute to the success or failure 
of a large-scale development project, see world BAnk & Int’l FIn. corp., chAd-cAmeroon 
petroleum development And pIpelIne project: overvIew 28–41 (2006), http://www-wds.
worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/09/19/000020953_20070
919092837/Rendered/PDF/36569.pdf (describing in detail the many unanticipated factors that 
contributed to the many problems associated with the Chad-Cameroon pipeline project).
3.     See, e.g., Int’l FIn. corp., stAkeholder enGAGement: A Good prActIce hAndBook For 
compAnIes doInG BusIness In emerGInG mArkets 63–66 (2007) (describing when and how 
companies should negotiate with stakeholders with respect to issues covered in stakeholder 
engagement plans).
4.     For an illustration of a stakeholder engagement plan, see newmont GhAnA, puBlIc con-
sultAtIon And dIsclosure plAn: Akyem project eAstern reGIon GhAnA (2010), http://www.
newmont.com/sites/default/files/Public_Consultation_and_Disclosure_Plan_May_2010_
Akyem_Project_1.pdf (outlining in detail the processes by and conditions under which the 
company will disclose information, identify stakeholders, select community representatives, 
maintain records, and address grievances).
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best to do these tasks. This is perhaps understandable because SEPs are themselves 
a relatively new phenomenon and because the issues they address are affected 
by a number of factors, including both hard and soft law from domestic and 
international sources. To be sure, the very existence of SEPs represents progress 
from the days when corporations and governments imposed their will with little 
regard for local communities. 
 Stakeholder engagement plans address many issues, but I will focus on 
three important aspects. First, SEPs must sort people into different categories, such 
as indigenous, affected by the project, and perhaps others. Because assignment into 
a category affects the benefits a person (or family or community) might claim from 
the project, the assignment is important both for the company and the community. 
Second, SEPs typically create a process by which those affected by the project either 
may or must resolve any complaints or claims they have regarding the project. Over 
time, the grievance process can become a principal means by which individuals not 
employed by the project interact with it. Third, SEPs define the terms by which the 
project’s participants, typically a company and one or more units of government, 
provide information about the project to affected communities. Embedded in most 
SEPs is the assumption that information flow is an important way of managing 
expectations, anticipating and addressing potential problems, and ensuring long-
term acceptance of the project. Related to this is the fact that SEPs often provide a 
mechanism by which affected communities can influence the substance of the project 
by, for example, indicating a preference for one possible road route over another. 
 What has been largely missing from the development of SEPs has been 
evidence as to how these tasks might be best performed. The process of designing 
SEPs has relied heavily on experts and focused on legal developments, but has not 
been guided by empirical evidence. In this Article, I put forward ways to address 
this deficiency. Parallel to the advent of SEPs has been a significant broadening 
of the use of randomized control trials (RCTs) in international development.5 In 
RCTs, researchers attempting to identify the best way to solve a particular problem 
randomly assign comparable individuals into groups, and each group receives a 
different treatment.6 Because the two groups are comparable, if there are different 
outcomes, the difference is because of the treatment. Randomized control trials 
have long been used to investigate public health issues, but only in the past decade 
have they become commonly used in economic development.7 What makes many 
of these randomized control trials interesting for my purposes is that many of them 
5.     See generally ABhIjIt v. BAnerjee & esther duFlo, poor economIcs: A rAdIcAl re-
thInkInG oF the wAy to FIGht GloBAl poverty (2011).
6.     Id. at 14 (“[In a randomized control trial] individuals or communities are randomly as-
signed to different ‘treatments’—different programs or different versions of the same pro-
gram. Since the individuals assigned to different treatments are exactly comparable (because 
they were chosen at random), any difference between them is the effect of the treatment.”).
7.     Id.
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have tested approaches to solving problems or allocating costs and benefits that are 
also used in SEPs. I examine some of this evidence and use it to suggest that some 
of the conventional wisdom found in many SEPs might not be the most appropriate 
way to make the decisions that the plan must make. 
 In this Article, I propose to draw on recent research from development 
economics, sociology, and other disciplines that use randomized control trials 
to assess how specific policies work at solving specific problems. Large-
scale development projects bring together companies, governments, and local 
communities, each of which has different resources, bargaining power, and values. 
To a considerable extent, SEPs determine the contours of how these relationships 
are structured, particularly with respect to the treatment of local communities. At 
present, most SEPs are shaped by legal requirements and conventional wisdom (and 
because they are negotiated, bargaining power plays a big role as well). I argue that 
this important area of development policy should not be left out of the revolution that 
is influencing many other areas of development policy and development scholarship.
 
I. the stAkeholder enGAGement processes
 The IFC is the private sector development section of the World Bank 
Group. Since at least 1993, the IFC has been the principal engine behind the drive 
to incorporate social and environmental considerations into the planning, selection, 
and management of large-scale development projects.8 The IFC plays an unusual 
role in development projects: part beneficent anti-poverty organization and part 
investment fund seeking to earn a return. As part of the World Bank Group, one of 
IFC’s explicit goals is to end extreme poverty. But because its focus is private sector 
development, the IFC does this by engaging directly with for-profit enterprises, not 
by providing grants or other services to those most in need or their governments. The 
IFC attempts to realize its mission by including in its loan or investment agreements 
social and environmental conditions. These requirements address a myriad of issues, 
including but certainly not limited to the kinds of issues that SEPs address. 
 In this Part, I first discuss the evolution of the IFC’s inclusion of social and 
environmental requirements for project sponsors. Although a full history of the 
IFC’s activities in the area of social and environmental policy is well beyond the 
scope of this Article, it is important to at least trace the incremental but seemingly 
inexorable path from suggestions about good practices to what are now specific 
and required provisions of binding contracts. What this brief history shows is that 
the IFC’s requirements have evolved principally by reference to law and rights, 
leavened by lessons drawn from prominent negative experiences in particular 
cases. This has all happened in the face of counter-arguments or opposition from 
8.     With regard to the IFC Performance Standards as soft law, see Kenneth W. Abbott & 
Duncan Snidal, International Regulation Without International Government: Improving IO 
Performance Through Orchestration, 5 rev. Int’l. orG. 315 (2010).
32
   Spring 2015                        Evidence-Based Stakeholder Engagement
those who viewed the requirements to be unnecessary, too expensive, or outside 
the remit of the IFC. To this point there has been little room for the testing of the 
IFC’s requirements. This is perhaps to be expected, and my argument is not meant 
as a criticism of what the IFC has done. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the 
policies that exist today are largely the product of legal argument and evolution, not 
solutions arrived at by experimentation and correction. 
 After tracing the history of the IFC’s social and environmental policies, I 
turn my attention to SEPs specifically. It is now commonplace for the IFC (and 
other institutional lenders) to require proponents of large-scale development 
projects to create a comprehensive plan to manage the project’s relationship 
with affected communities. SEPs are the way that most companies fulfill these 
obligations. For example, when the international mining company Rio Tinto and 
its local partners initiated a mining development project in the Simandou mountain 
range in eastern Guinea, in West Africa, the companies created an SEP to govern the 
project’s “engagement with external stakeholders.”9 Similarly, the mining company 
AngloGold Ashanti developed an SEP to define its relationship with a wide range 
of stakeholders (and to indicate how it determined who the stakeholders were).10 
 
A. The Evolution and Content of the IFC’s Social and Environmental 
Requirements
 
 The IFC’s job is to fight poverty by promoting the growth of private sector 
enterprises in developing countries. It does this by making loans to companies 
investing in private sector development projects, taking equity stakes in those 
projects, and providing project finance, among other things. These activities have 
put the IFC at the center of some of the largest and most controversial development 
projects in recent decades. And one of the most vexing problems in many projects 
has been the relationship between the communities affected by the project and 
the project’s proponents. At its core, the IFC’s approach has been to link financial 
assistance to improvements in environmental and social standards.11 The IFC’s 
practices in this area have evolved incrementally, but it is useful to divide the 
9.     sImFer sA, rIo tInto, sImAndou project seIA stAkeholder enGAGement plAn 1 
(2012).
10.     srk consultInG, monGBwAlu project stAkeholder enGAGement plAn 1–2 (2011) 
(report prepared for Ashanti Goldfields Kilo SARL, a subsidiary of AngloGold Ashanti).
11.     In the words of Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, who was Vice President and General Counsel of 
the World Bank and helped to create MIGA, “[f]inancial mechanisms should not be viewed 
simply as ways of providing money for environmental problems. . . . [I]nternational financial 
institutions can assist in developing standards and ensuring compliance with them through 
financial incentives.” Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, International Financing Mechanisms and Institu-
tional Responses, Address at the American Bar Association Twentieth Annual Conference on 
the Environment, in Am. BAr Assoc., the role oF lAw In the 1992 unIted nAtIons conFer-
ence on envIronment And development 11, 13 (1991). 
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history into rough periods. It is important to note that because the legal and policy 
changes were not imposed in a coherent or linear way, some current projects are 
subject to rules developed in an earlier period, and some older projects had aspects 
of the rules that only later became the norm. Nonetheless, this rough history does 
bring into clearer focus the most important developments along the way.12
 In the first period, the principal means of engagement was the one-way 
provision of information from those controlling the project to those affected by the 
project.13 This meant that the IFC required project proponents to gather information 
and make certain disclosures to affected communities.14 There was little that 
affected communities could do to give expression to their opinions on the project. 
The principal justifications for making these disclosures were instrumental: doing 
so was thought to reduce costs by reducing political risk, ensuring a congenial 
work environment, and avoiding potentially costly conflicts with workers, the 
host-country government, or other local stakeholders. This approach represented a 
change for the better from the days in which corporations and governments mostly 
did as they pleased to local people, but it did not stem the flow of complaints about 
projects or the IFC’s participation in them. 
12.     My focus on the development of the IFC Performance Standards and their effect on 
development projects is not to suggest that this is the only factor in the increasing prominence 
of SEPs. Another important factor has been work done under the auspices of the United Na-
tions to convince corporations that is in their interests to engage with stakeholders and ensure 
that their projects are sustainable and do as little harm as possible. For a thorough review of 
this cluster of arguments in favor of stakeholder engagement, see Beth kytle & john GerArd 
ruGGIe, corporAte socIAl responsIBIlIty As rIsk mAnAGement: A model For multInAtIon-
Als (Corporate Soc. Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper No. 10, 2005). Ruggie and his 
colleagues ultimately produced an influential report that concluded that businesses have a 
duty, but not a legal obligation, to protect human rights and attempt to ensure sustainable 
development. See john ruGGIe, protect, respect And remedy: A FrAmework For BusIness 
And humAn rIGhts (2008), http://www.reports-and-materials.org/sites/default/files/reports-
and-materials/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf.
13.     For a thorough history of the changes to the IFC Performance Standards in 1998 and 
2006, see generally Elisa Morgera, Significant Trends in Corporate Environmental Account-
ability: The New Performance Standards of the International Finance Corporation, 18 
colo. j. Int’l envtl. l. & pol’y 151 (2007). Morgera argues that the 1998 iteration of the 
Performance Standards largely focused on the incorporation of legal standards regarding 
environmental protection into the IFC’s policies and practices. Id. at 155. In contrast, the 2006 
iteration includes social sustainability issues as well. Id. at 156.
14.     See, e.g., Int’l FIn. corp., Good prActIce note: AddressInG the socIAl dImensIons oF 
prIvAte sector projects (2003) (describing obligations under IFC policies to gather data on 
projects before and after their commencement and the requirements of providing information 
to affected communities).
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 The second period began when the IFC revised its performance standards to 
require not just the provision of information, but also some level of consultation.15 The 
policies behind this shift gave many affected communities formal opportunities to be 
heard. Instead of merely being the passive recipients of information passed along by 
the company, affected communities now could respond in meaningful ways to those 
developing or managing the project. The IFC’s policies did not change in a vacuum, of 
course, and one of the most influential trends was an increased recognition of the rights 
of indigenous people to participate in development decisions.16 In addition, during 
this period the concept of sustainable development began to gain traction in tangible 
ways,17 such as imposing requirements that projects mitigate their environmental 
impacts, compensating those affected by the environmental consequences of projects, 
or considering altering projects so as to minimize the environmental impacts, even if 
doing so would make the project somewhat more costly. 
 The final period—and the current state of play in this area—has two dominant 
features.18 The first is a clear focus on environmental issues, including climate change, 
in development projects. This focus takes different forms in different contexts, but the 
common notion is that projects supported by the IFC (and other parts of the World Bank 
Group) should no longer cause environmental harm. For too long, environmental harms 
were a kind of externality that proponents of projects were not required to account for in 
any meaningful way. Although many people affected by development projects continue 
to have legitimate grievances, it is true that environmental issues are increasingly treated 
as a cost that must be incorporated into the project rather than left for others to bear.19 
15.     The IFC’s efforts to change its policies also affected other important actors, none more 
so than the banks that provide the financing to many large-scale development projects. In the 
early 2000s, a group of banks came together to develop their own, voluntary standards that 
would set policy regarding environmental and social impact issues, and based their policies 
on the IFC Performance Standards. See Ariel Meyerstein, The New Protectors of Rio: Global 
Finance and the Sustainable Development Agenda, 12 sustAInABle dev. l. & pol’y 15, 16 
(2012) (arguing that banks developed the Equator Principles based on the IFC Performance 
Standards); see also Bert Scholtens & Lammertjan Dam, Banking on the Equator: Are Banks 
that Adopted the Equator Principles Different from Non-Adopters?, 35 world dev. 1307, 
1308−09 (2007) (describing the role of banks in the history of the development of the Equator 
Principles).
16.     See, e.g., stAkeholder enGAGement, supra note 3, at 47−52 (discussing requirements 
for consultation with indigenous and tribal peoples).
17.     The concept of sustainable development has been part of discussions about develop-
ment for at least three decades. See dAvId Freestone, the world BAnk And sustAInABle 
development: leGAl essAys 8–16 (2012) (tracing the evolution of the concept of sustainable 
development in World Bank policies from the mid-1980s to the present). 
18.     For a comprehensive discussion of recent changes to the IFC Performance Standards, 
particularly with respect to disclosure obligations and consultation requirements, see Sha-
landa H. Baker, Why the IFC’s Free, Prior, and Informed Consent Policy Doesn’t Matter (Yet) 
to Indigenous Communities Affected by Development Projects, 30 wIs. Int’l l.j. 668, 678–81 
(2013). 
19.     Freestone, supra note 17, at 10–11.
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 The second dominant feature of the current status of social and environmental 
requirements is that the area is increasingly legalized, with various groups having 
positive claims against the project or the government supporting it, and those supporting 
the project having positive obligations. For example, indigenous people have specific 
and cognizable claims to benefits from projects and can, under some circumstances, 
claim those benefits before others. Project proponents must study the social and 
environmental impacts of their work, develop plans to minimize or mitigate those 
impacts, and provide their plans to affected communities. No longer are these steps 
treated as merely good ideas that might have some commercial payoff for the company. 
Instead, they are requirements that can be enforced using hard or soft law mechanisms.
 
B. Stakeholder Engagement Plans in the Context of Social and 
Environmental Requirements
 
 Under the IFC’s approach, proponents of a new private sector development 
project must identify the people and areas likely to be affected by a project, specify 
the risks and adverse impacts on those people and places, and show how the project 
either tries to avoid those adverse impacts, how it tries to minimize them, or how it will 
provide compensation for those impacts that cannot be avoided. The IFC’s Sustainability 
Framework is the umbrella under which all such regulations fit. The Sustainability 
Framework is equal parts strategic plan and operational instructions, including policy 
statements about the IFC’s commitment to sustainability, the specific rules that 
govern projects, and detailed instructions about how to implement those rules.20 The 
Sustainability Framework includes the IFC Performance Standards, which are rules 
governing eight categories of potential issues.21 Under the IFC’s approach, Performance 
Standard 1 requires project proponents to undertake a comprehensive “assessment to 
identify the environmental and social impacts, risks, and opportunities” of the project.22 
With this review, typically called an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment 
(ESIA), clients assess potential adverse social and environmental outcomes and 
identify a number of factors that suggest the project might cause harms to particularly 
vulnerable populations or pose other risks.23 Depending on the results of the ESIA, the 
project is governed by other Performance Standards which have the goal of minimizing 
or mitigating those adverse impacts.24 
  Once proponents of a project have completed the ESIA, it is possible to 
develop a stakeholder engagement plan.25 Under the IFC Performance Standards, an 
20.     Int’l FIn. corp., world BAnk Grp., Overview to IFc perFormAnce stAndArds on envI-
ronmentAl And socIAl sustAInABIlIty, at i (2012).
21.     Id. (listing the eight Performance Standards).
22.     Id.
23.     Id. at 3–4 (IFC Performance Standard 1).
24.     Id. at 3, 5.
25.     Id. at 7. 
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SEP is the scheme by which those promoting the development project are required 
to structure their relationship with the people affected by the project. It represents 
a number of commitments from the project’s proponents to local communities. 
An SEP is thus the part of the overall environmental and social strategy that most 
directly affects local communities. The IFC Performance Standards allow for 
flexibility in the creation of an SEP, calling for it to be tailored to the project and 
the affected communities.26 
 Even with this flexibility, the IFC suggests that an SEP should include a 
number of elements. First, an SEP should include an analysis of who the stakeholders 
are, and what kind of stake each group or community has in the project.27 Implicit 
in this analysis is an examination of the risks that the project poses to the affected 
community (and to the environment). Whether any particular IFC Performance 
Standard applies depends on the outcome of the initial review. If the project is 
likely to harm public health, create dangerous working conditions, or pollute the 
local environment, then an SEP must include a plan to account for these risks.28 
Thus, one of the functions of an SEP is to allocate the social and environmental 
costs of the project—for example, which group will bear the costs of environmental 
degradation and what the compensation will be for such an impact. 
 Second, the ESIA must identify any social groups that are particularly 
vulnerable, including indigenous groups. An SEP must then describe how the project 
will account for the potential harms to these groups. Issues relating to indigenous 
groups are governed by IFC Performance Standard 7 on the theory that such groups 
are especially vulnerable to exploitation and unlikely to have the social power to 
fully advocate their concerns.29 Under an SEP, members of indigenous groups may 
receive enhanced compensation for harms also visited upon other groups. In this 
way, the SEP allocates benefits among stakeholders.
 Third, the ESIA must include a plan for addressing any grievances 
that may arise during the project. The grievance mechanism must be designed 
so as to “receive and facilitate resolution of . . . concerns and grievances about
26.     Id. (requiring clients to “develop and implement a Stakeholder Engagement Plan that is 
scaled to the project risks and impacts and development stage, and . . . tailored to the charac-
teristics and interests of the [sic] Affected Communities”).
27.     See id. at 7.
28.     These issues would be governed by Performance Standard 2 (Labor and Working Con-
ditions), id. at 16−21, Performance Standard 4 (Community Health, Safety, and Security), id. 
at 27−30, and Performance Standard 6 (Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Manage-
ment of Living Natural Resources), id. at 40−46.
29.     Id. at 47−52 (IFC Performance Standard 7).
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the client’s environmental and social performance.”30 The IFC suggests that a 
grievance mechanism should be transparent, should resolve issues promptly, and 
should be open to the affected community.31 Beyond this, the IFC Performance 
Standards do not specify the structure or content of the grievance mechanism. 
Closely related to the grievance mechanism is the requirement that an SEP must 
include a plan by which the project’s proponents and managers communicate with 
affected communities. As with other issues, the IFC Performance Standards do not 
specify the structure and content of the communication apparatus. Instead, what is 
required is that the communications process function effectively.32
 One of the strategic objectives of SEPs is to further the interests of those 
promoting the new development project. This is often framed in terms of attempting 
to create a social license to operate (SLO). An SLO exists when a project “is seen 
as having the broad, ongoing approval and acceptance of society to conduct its 
activities.”33 Only recently have scholars studied SLOs in earnest, but there is 
already a burgeoning literature on how a project’s proponents can secure an SLO, 
the normative and theoretical aspects of different levels or types of SLOs, and 
the costs and benefits to companies of securing, or not securing, an SLO.34 What 
is important for my purposes is that my argument is entirely consonant with this 
approach. When those involved in a project are able to do the tasks contained in an 
SEP efficiently and in a way that satisfies everyone involved, the project is more 
likely to succeed and more likely to actually improve the welfare of those involved. 
When there are contentious and sustained disagreements over those issues that are 
incompletely or unsatisfactorily resolved, the project is less likely to prosper and 
much less likely to improve the lives of those affected by it. 
30.     Id. at 9. 
31.     Id.
32.     See id. (discussing requirements for external communications).
33.     Jason Prno & D. Scott Slocombe, Exploring the Origins of “Social License to Operate” 
in the Mining Sector: Perspectives from Governance and Sustainability Theories, 37 res. 
pol’y 346, 346 (2012). 
34.     See generally Ana Maria Esteves, Daniel Franks & Frank Vanclay, Social Impact As-
sessment: The State of the Art, 30 ImpAct Assessment & project ApprAIsAl 34 (2012) (criti-
cally assessing the goals of the various processes and mandates to manage the social issues 
associated with development projects and arguing in favor of enhanced means to assess the 
impact of such programs); Silva Larson, Thomas G. Measham & Liana J. Williams, Remotely 
Engaged? Toward a Framework for Monitoring the Success of Stakeholder Engagement in 
Remote Regions, 53 j. env’t plAn. & mGmt. 827 (2010) (reviewing the literature on the mea-
surement of stakeholder engagement and arguing in favor of a set of qualitative and quantita-
tive indicators of the effectiveness of stakeholder engagement processes in resource extraction 
sites); John R. Owen & Deanna Kemp, Social License and Mining: A Critical Perspective, 38 
res. pol’y 29 (2013) (documenting the near ubiquity of the concept of “social license to op-
erate” in the rhetoric of resource extraction firms and analyzing the causes and consequences 
of acquiring or not acquiring an SLO).
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 The conventional approach to SEPs is likely a function of their history. 
In large measure, the conventional approach to SEPs reflects an improvement 
in the ways that corporations and governments view and treat members of poor 
communities. Indeed, the existence of SEPs shows an increase in the importance 
given to the welfare of local and host communities.35 I do not argue that SEPs are 
wrong in theory or inevitably flawed. Instead I argue that there are ways to make 
them better. 
 The concept which unifies the requirements for SEPs discussed in the 
previous section is that each is a functional requirement: the goal is for an SEP to 
accomplish particular tasks, not for an SEP to conform to a rigid or formal template. 
This flexibility is important because it opens the door to reconceive SEPs as a 
means to solve specific (albeit complex) problems. If the goal of an SEP is to solve 
specific problems, rather than to conform to a specific template, then the next step 
should be to investigate the tasks an SEP must perform, and identify ways that it 
can do those tasks more effectively and efficiently. 
 
II. ImprovInG stAkeholder enGAGement plAns 
  
 SEPs have become legalized documents that often speak of rights and 
obligations, create entities with many of the characteristics of a court, and provide for 
the resolution of legal claims and the enforcement of those decisions. Despite these 
appearances, it is more helpful to conceive of stakeholder engagement documents 
as complex work plans. They describe how those affected by the project—the 
company, government, and local people—will allocate the benefits and costs of the 
project, make important decisions, and resolve disputes. The goal of this Article is 
to argue that SEPs can do their assigned tasks better, and the way to accomplish this 
is to look to existing empirical research on similar issues and to identify areas for 
empirical research on SEPs directly. 
Before moving on, it is important to acknowledge the potential benefits 
and very real limitations of my approach, and to explain why it is worthy of 
consideration. Rigorous RCTs are tightly constructed. At the outset of any study 
there is, of course, a general research question.  An example of such a question 
is, “what is the best way to reduce the spread of malaria?” or “what should local 
governments do to increase school attendance?” But the real insights come from 
the construction of a very specific research question, for example, “will this specific 
35.     For a comprehensive analysis of the evolution corporate-community relations in the 
context of development and human rights, see Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human 
Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 yAle l.j. 443, 452–60 (2001). Ratner identifies 
the relationships among four key actors as the principal determinants of the role of human 
rights in international business: the home state, the host state, the corporation, and the affected 
population of the host state. Id. at 452. One of the consequences of the increase in importance 
of the welfare of the affected population is the development of the ESIA process and the use 
of SEPs. 
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intervention do a better job of reducing the spread of malaria than that specific 
intervention?” Thus, the best studies test specific propositions or treatments.
 Researchers must also attend to the selection of their test populations. The 
RCTs that are most useful for issues related to stakeholder engagement are the 
ones that test policies on many communities. Researchers attempt to pick places 
or populations that are as similar to each other as possible, in as many ways as 
possible. If the two test populations are sufficiently similar, this helps researchers 
conclude that any difference in outcome is the result of the specific intervention, 
and not the result of some other difference between the two populations. 
 One consequence of this specificity is that researchers can take the results 
seriously. In the language of the social sciences, this refers to the internal validity 
of the study: whether the research design allows “the drawing of valid inferences 
about the relationships between variables.”36 All of the studies that I rely on in this 
Article were done in such a way as to maximize their internal validity, meaning that 
the results may be reliably held to explain the relationship between the variables 
under examination.  
 But, strictly speaking, the results of any particular RCT mean that this 
intervention, used in this context, at this time, produced this result.37 Of course, 
the results of individual RCTs do not answer the general question once and for 
all.38 More importantly, the results of any particular RCT do not mean that the 
intervention found most efficacious will work everywhere, or even elsewhere in the 
same country. Because the best RCTs are specific and test narrow questions, they 
have a high degree of internal validity. But one consequence of this specificity is 
that it can be difficult to generalize—to use the results of a particular RCT to draw 
inferences about whether a similar intervention would work in a different context. 
This is a separate question—that of external validity39—and, crudely speaking, it
36.     roBert m. lAwless, jennIFer k. roBBennolt & thomAs s. ulen, empIrIcAl methods In 
lAw 36 (2010). 
37.     See rAchel Glennerster & kudzAI tAkAvArAshA, runnInG rAndomIzed evAluAtIons: 
A prActIcAl GuIde 392 (2013) (noting that a study can be said to have “internal validity” if 
“we can be reasonably confident that the impact we measure is an unbiased estimate of the 
true impact in this context”). 
38.     See Michael J. Saks, Improving APA Science Translation Amicus Briefs, 17 lAw & 
hum. BehAv. 235, 240 (1993) (arguing that there is a “nearly universal consensus that a single 
study is not sufficient” to answer most research questions); see also lAwless et Al., supra 
note 36, at 47 (noting that “no individual study will be dispositive of a given research ques-
tion”).
39.     See lAwless et Al., supra note 36, at 36−40.
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is the point of conducting RCTs in the first place.40 RCTs would be of little utility 
in the development context if it were impossible to apply the lessons learned from 
studies done in one place to problems in a different place. 
  This does not mean that RCTs should not be used to inform general 
policy discussions; they should and are used in this way. But it does mean that 
it is important to acknowledge that results from RCTs do not provide the final 
answer to general policy questions, and that generalizing based on results from 
these sources must be done with some caution. Despite this limitation, RCTs are 
useful to policymakers and, I argue, should inform policy debates about stakeholder 
engagement plans. RCTs are part of a larger trend in development policy: the use of 
nuanced, rigorously obtained evidence to influence development decisions.41 The 
use of data in development is not new, of course, but evidence of the type that RCTs 
produce is relatively new and undeniably important. 
  
 A.  Distributing Benefits and Burdens
  
 One of the tasks that an international development project must perform 
is to categorize people. Categorization decisions can be profoundly important to 
people affected by the project: they can determine who benefits from the project, 
who can be asked to bear the costs of the project, who will be displaced by the 
project, and who will keep his or her land. Under the approach followed by the 
40.     See generally Glennerster & tAkAvArAshA, supra note 37, at 392 (“[T]he questions 
most relevant to policy go beyond the specifics of one program: If the program was tested and 
worked well in one district of the country, will it work in other districts? If it worked in one 
country, will it work in another country? If it worked at one point in time, will it work at other 
times when conditions may have changed? If it worked at a small scale, will it work at a large 
scale?”).
41.     The increasing and increasingly sophisticated use of evidence to inform development 
decisions has taken many forms, three of which bear mention. The first is the use of large-
n econometric studies to draw conclusions about development policies and their effect on 
individuals, regions, and countries. This is not new, of course, but it is increasingly prominent 
and is being done in a more sophisticated and nuanced way than ever before. The second 
is the reliance on indicators to influence development (and governance) decisions. Kevin 
E. Davis, Benedict Kingsbury & Sally Engle Merry, Introduction: Global Governance by 
Indicators, in GovernAnce By IndIcAtors: GloBAl power throuGh QuAntIFIcAtIon And rAnk-
InGs 3 (Kevin E. Davis et al. eds., 2012). Davis et al. critically assess the increasing use of 
collections of “rank-ordered data that purports to represent the past or projected performance 
of different units.” Id. at 6. Finally, for an example of the use of randomized control studies, 
see generally jonAthAn BAuchet, crIstoBAl mArshAll, lAurA stArItA, jeAnette thomAs & 
AnnA yAlourIs, lAtest FIndInGs From rAndomIzed evAluAtIons oF mIcroFInAnce (2011). 
Bauchet et al. report, under the auspices of the World Bank, on a wide range of randomized 
control studies of various ways to structure microfinance programs. Id. at 20–23. Bauchet et 
al. describe the results of the studies and note that, taken together, the studies “provide a more 
nuanced and precise set of information on how to better design, price, and market microinsur-
ance products.” Id. at 19.
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IFC and most other large-scale development projects, such decisions are made 
using a highly legalized process. There are explicit rules, negotiated in reflection of 
prevailing domestic and international law, designed to implement particular policy 
preferences. Because these rules are then implemented in a community with its 
own norms, dynamics, and dysfunctions, the results on the ground are inevitably 
different than a proponent of the rules might have anticipated. Nonetheless, the rules 
themselves are important because embedded in them are judgments about how best 
to construct the categories into which people are sorted.42 These judgments take two 
forms: substantive conclusions about what the categories should be and procedural 
conclusions about how best to make categorization decisions. 
 One of the first decisions that must be made with respect to any development 
project is to determine who is affected by it. Those who are in the category of 
“affected” typically receive a proportionately higher share of benefits than would 
other citizens who, for whatever reason, are not in the “affected” category. People 
in affected communities might be entitled to more compensation for their land, 
assistance in the event that their livelihoods are adversely affected by the project, 
or preferred status when they apply for jobs with the project. The rules governing 
these decisions are typically based on two principal factors: identifying people who 
live in geographic proximity to the project area and will presumably be affected by 
it, and by determining who has strong ties to the area such that their interests in the 
area might be stronger than those of others.43 
 A second and closely related decision that must be made in most development 
projects is to determine who is “indigenous” to the affected area. Under the law, 
those who are placed in the “indigenous” category are entitled to even more rights 
and benefits than others in the “affected” category. The practical importance of 
indigeneity is related almost entirely to the law. 
 The task of assigning members of a community into meaningful categories 
is one that occurs frequently in development endeavors. For example, when 
governments create social benefit programs to provide support to those in need, 
the program must determine who in the population is eligible for the benefits. To 
do this, governments might rely on formal criteria, such as tax records to verify 
household income, or land ownership to determine who lives in a particular area. 
Because such formal indicia are often incomplete or absent, development programs 
sometimes use proxy-means tests or other second-order criteria to draw the same 
conclusions. These tests rely on the collection of data on individuals or families that 
42.     To be sure, it is entirely possible that the rules reflect received wisdom rather than ac-
tual decisions about how best to construct categories or what the categories should be. 
43.     There are likely additional reasons that those living closest to the project area are 
treated differently. For example, because they are in the best position to cooperate with or 
resist the project, their relationship to the project might influence an investor’s views as to the 
relative riskiness of the project.
42
   Spring 2015                        Evidence-Based Stakeholder Engagement
is then objectively assessed.44 For example, a proxy-means test to determine which 
members of a community are poor enough to qualify for social benefit programs 
might collect information on observable characteristics of a household, such as the 
condition of the dwelling, the types of goods the household consumes, the location 
of the dwelling, and the like. 
 An alternative to proxy-means testing (or the use of formal criteria) is 
what is often called “community-based targeting.”45 To do this, the government 
or development agency enlists community members, often community leaders, 
to identify who in the community should receive the benefits. This is thought to 
rely on local knowledge and definitions of poverty or wealth. Because the process 
relies on the subjective impressions of people who are themselves embedded in 
the community and connected to those whose eligibility they assess, this method 
can be open to abuse. In the literature on community engagement processes, the 
conventional wisdom is that elites will capture the process and allocate more 
benefits to their families or friends, or direct benefits away from people who belong 
to disfavored groups or are otherwise without social power.46 For development 
professionals, this has meant choosing between the benefits of a community-based 
process, with the presumed risk of elite capture, or using an imperfect, proxy-based 
process without the presumed risk of elite capture.
 To test this proposition, researchers conducted a randomized evaluation to 
assess how well each method worked, whether elite capture was a significant risk, 
and how acceptable the results of each process were to community members.47 The 
objective of the program under assessment was to provide cash assistance to poor 
families in Indonesia.48 One problem the program confronted was identifying who 
should receive the benefits. The program attempted to ensure that as many truly 
needy families as possible received benefits, while guarding against the possibility 
that ineligible households did not receive benefits.49 Another objective was to ensure 
that the program’s beneficiaries were selected pursuant to neutral and defensible 
criteria, not because of personal relationships or social or political power.50 
 To assess how best to identify the appropriate beneficiaries of the transfers, 
researchers tested three targeting methods. Researchers divided households in 
640 Indonesian villages into three groups, and used a different method to identify 
44.     Proxy Means Testing, the world BAnk, http://go.worldbank.org/SSMKS9WUT0 (Dec. 
30, 2014).
45.     Community-Based Targeting, the world BAnk, http://go.worldbank.org/T9FCYR-
WWO0 (Dec. 30, 2014). 
46.     Id.
47.     Vivi Alatas, Abhijit Banerjee, Rema Hanna, Benjamin A. Olken & Julia Tobias, Tar-
geting the Poor: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia, 102 Am. econ. rev. 1206 
(2012). 
48.     See id. at 1208.
49.     Id. at 1218−19.
50.     Id. at 1227−29.
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beneficiaries in each group.51 One method was to survey the households on a 
variety of measures, including such things as the combined assets of those living 
in the household, their education level, and their jobs.52 This method, called proxy-
means testing (PMT), used various indicators to construct a numerical score for 
each household; those Indonesian test households with the lowest scores received 
assistance from the program. For many researchers, PMT is the gold standard 
because it is ostensibly objective.53 If researchers ask the right questions and 
accurately record the answers, then the results are free of personal biases or political 
considerations. The second method was what researchers called “community-based 
targeting.”54 For this group, researchers asked residents to rank the households in 
their community from richest to poorest. Community members used their own 
criteria and were asked to assess every household in the village. The final method 
was a hybrid of the first two.55 For villages in this group, residents first ranked 
the households and then researchers verified “1.5 times the ‘beneficiary quota’ of 
households” to conduct PMT surveys.56 
 Researchers found that PMT was the most accurate method of identifying 
poor households, but that community-based targeting was likely to produce a more 
efficient and satisfactory program.57 Researchers also found that, compared with 
community targeting, PMT had the lowest error rate when errors were defined as 
incorrectly determining whether a household lived on two dollars per day or less.58 
Community-based targeting, in which villagers were asked to rank themselves and 
their neighbors, was nearly as accurate as PMT and produced results that were 
much more satisfactory to the community than either PMT or the hybrid method.59 
Communities were able to construct meaningful categories about who was poor 
enough to appropriately benefit from the program and who was not.60 
 There are two questions from the study that merit particular attention for 
my purposes: why did community members come up with different beneficiary lists 
than the PMT method, and why were community members more satisfied with the 
lists produced by community targeting? Both are relevant to applying this evidence 
to SEPs and suggestive of ways to construct controlled trials specifically for the 
SEP context.
51.     Id. at 1211−15.
52.     Id. at 1212.
53.     See id. at 1207.
54.     Id. at 1212 (classifying as “community-based targeting” and “community targeting” in-
terchangeably). 
55.     Id. at 1213−14.
56.     Id. at 1213.
57.     Id. at 1227.
58.     Id. at 1208, 1218−20.
59.     Id. at 1208, 1225−27.
60.     See id. at 1212−13.
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 As to the first question, one possible answer is that the members of the 
community did not have the same amount or type of information as that available 
to the researchers who conducted the extensive PMT interviews. Interviewers 
obtained extensive and wide-ranging information about individual households and 
relied on this to determine eligibility for the assistance program. Interestingly, the 
evidence suggested that members of the community relied on essentially the same 
information as the PMT researchers.61 The community-based targeting method 
produced a different result because members of the community appeared to rely on 
a “systematic, broadly shared notion of welfare” to produce a beneficiary list that 
reflected this “different concept of welfare.”62 Thus, community members appeared 
to use the same information but assigned different weight to the various factors to 
arrive at their determinations. 
 Although the results of the study did not permit researchers to draw 
definitive conclusions, the evidence did suggest that there was a cluster of factors 
that were particularly important to community members.63 For the PMT method, 
researchers used per capita consumption to determine eligibility. They used various 
indicators to construct the measure of poverty, including the size of the household, 
whether the head of the household was a widow, and the number of children in the 
household (including who was entitled to their labor). When they compared the 
results of the community targeting method to the PMT method, researchers found 
that the evidence suggested that community members understood households 
differently than the way the PMT model might suggest.64 First, community 
members appeared to believe that there were economies of scale within households, 
such that larger households (with access to more labor but sharing costs) would 
fare better than smaller households. Second, community members also appeared 
to recognize that some households would have an easier time weathering shocks 
than other households. For example, households with strong ties to economic 
elites that were poor according to the PMT method—meaning that their per capita 
consumption was consistent with that of other poor households—were viewed 
as less poor by community members than households not similarly connected to 
elites.65 Community members may have reasoned that elite-connected households 
could rely on their connections as a kind of emergency insurance policy. Similarly, 
the community targeting method ranked households headed by widows as poorer 
than their consumption baskets would have otherwise suggested. This result might 
be explained by the belief that persons with lower social power were less capable 
of withstanding shocks, or that their long-term economic potential was lower 
than their current consumption patterns might suggest. Either way, it appears that 
community members consistently brought their understanding of the importance of 
social power to their conclusions about poverty and benefits. 
61.     Id. at 1234–37.
62.     Id. at 1234.
63.     Id. at 1236 tbl.12. 
64.     Id. at 1231−34.
65.     Id. at 1237 & n.38.
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 The second important question from the Indonesia study is why community 
members were more satisfied with targeting decisions made according to the 
community-based model as opposed to the PMT or hybrid models. At first blush 
these results might appear difficult to understand. One of the purported benefits of 
the PMT method is that the results are free from any allegations of subjectivity. 
Individuals should know that beneficiaries were chosen because of objective, non-
political factors. The method is also thought to account for the risk of elite capture—
the potential for political or social elites to take over the process and direct benefits 
to their relatives or supporters. Despite this, members of the community were more 
satisfied with the results from the community-based method. One possible reason 
is that the results were more aligned with what members of the community thought 
were the important factors. 
 The difference in community satisfaction had potentially powerful practical 
effects. First, when community members were more satisfied with the distributional 
results, there were fewer complaints about the program.66 Fewer complaints should 
mean lower administrative costs over the long run—important for any program and 
particularly important for a large-scale development project designed to last for 
many years. The second practical effect of higher community satisfaction is that it 
produced an easier disbursal process.67 Higher community satisfaction meant that 
those in charge of disbursing the benefits could do so more quickly and efficiently. 
As when there are fewer complaints, a more efficient disbursal process should 
produce lower administrative costs over the long run. 
 Consider how the insights from this study might be applied to SEPs. Recall 
that one of the important issues that an SEP must address is indigeneity: determining 
who fits into this category and, therefore, will receive additional benefits (or avoid 
costs borne by non-indigenous affected persons). The results of the Indonesia 
trial suggest that community members might be capable of making this decision 
based on multiple, locally contingent factors. If the principal reasons to require that 
indigeneity decisions be made according to formal criteria are to avoid the corruption 
of the process by those with more social power and to ensure that those affected by 
the project are satisfied with the result, this study suggests that a different process 
might work just as well or better. This would be in contrast to a legalized approach 
relying on ostensibly objective determinations made according to formal (and 
perhaps arbitrary) indicators of indigeneity.68 Put slightly differently, the evidence 
suggests that communities used an alternative definition of poverty that considered 
66.     Id. at 1225–26. 
67.     Id. at 1227.
68.     For a fuller discussion of the many problems with the concept of indigeneity, and the 
effect of these conceptual problems on policy, see Patrick J. Keenan, Business, Human Rights, 
and Communities: The Problem of Community Consent in Development, 37 FordhAm Int’l 
l.j. onlIne 44, 66–69 (2014) (arguing that the concept of indigeneity has confused scholars 
and policymakers alike).
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social power as well as wealth or analogous criteria. Researchers suggested that 
the community’s judgments appeared to be “informed by a better understanding of 
factors that affect a household’s earning potential or vulnerability.”69 
 Decisions with respect to indigeneity in the SEP context might well turn on 
similar factors. It is plausible that these same communities might use an alternative 
definition of indigeneity, or of “who is affected,” that reflects a “better understanding 
of . . . vulnerability,”70 such as the kind of social power that can come from (or be 
reduced by) family networks or widowhood. The current approach does not leave 
room for consideration of social power or similar factors, relying as it does on the 
formal application of a legal definition.
 Insights from the study might be applied to SEPs in an additional way. 
Community satisfaction is an important factor in both contexts and would likely 
have similar practical benefits. In the context of the Indonesia study, community 
satisfaction would likely reduce administrative costs in a variety of ways. In the 
context of SEPs, community satisfaction might directly contribute to enhancing 
the social license to operate. This should be appealing to the project’s proponents 
because it would likely reduce the risk that the project would fail, and would 
accomplish this in a way that might be less costly than other methods of developing 
a social license to operate. The more community support there is, the deeper the 
satisfaction runs, and the more sustained that satisfaction is, the more likely it is that 
a project will receive favorable financing and face fewer social and political risks. 
 B. Grievance Processes and Information Flow
 
 Stakeholder engagement plans developed as a way to both ensure that 
affected communities had access to information about development projects, and 
a means to bring their grievances to the attention of the projects’ managers. These 
two functions are required by the IFC Performance Standards and were considered a 
“best practice” even before they were required. Despite the ubiquity and importance 
of these provisions, there has been relatively little attention to their design or 
effectiveness. Most grievance and information processes, at their core, amount to 
an open-door policy in which community members are given information and are 
free to come to the project’s managers with their complaints with the assurance 
that those complaints will be addressed under the rules prescribed in the SEP. To 
be sure, the existence of disclosure policies and grievance mechanisms represents 
substantial progress from the days in which there were no effective means for 
community members to receive information about projects or to bring complaints 
to the attention of the project’s managers. In this Section, I analyze recent research 
to show that the current models, appealing as they may be, may not be the optimal 
means to accomplish what they are designed to accomplish. Although the flaws 
69.     Alatas et al., supra note 47, at 1239.
70.     Id.
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in each process are similar, I analyze them separately to show how each might be 
changed to better serve its intended purpose.
  
 1.   Grievance Processes
 
 All SEPs create a process to resolve complaints or grievances that community 
members might have regarding the project. The typical grievance process is a 
company-controlled process in which community members are permitted to bring 
complaints. On the surface such a model looks appealing: there are typically 
no barriers regarding the type of claim, pleading standards are minimal, and 
complainants are promised that their complaints will at least be heard. Nonetheless, 
recent research suggests that such a process is flawed in important ways. 
 A principal flaw with most grievances processes is that they ensure that for 
most people, their first meaningful engagement with the project is a confrontation. 
Grievance mechanisms are used only by people with an existing complaint about 
the project. At first blush, this seems both obvious and trivial; it should come as 
no surprise that grievance mechanisms are used by those with grievances. But 
recall that the purpose of most grievance mechanisms is to improve community 
engagement by providing people affected by the project with a point of access to 
the project’s managers. Often, the grievance process is the only point of access for 
members of the affected community. This means that before using the grievance 
process, members of the community are likely to have come to a negative opinion 
about at least some aspect of the project, and that this opinion is often so strong that 
it may overcome any disinclination to engage with the project. 
 Two implications flow from this analysis. First, it might be better for 
members of the community to have an introduction to the project that does not 
involve the filing of a grievance. To be sure, because the IFC Performance Standards 
require that community members are provided with information about the project, 
a grievance is not literally the first encounter with the project for most people. 
However, it certainly can be the first meaningful engagement with the project, and 
it takes place in a confrontational posture. 
 The second implication of this analysis is that the current process is 
more open to elite capture than would be the case under an alternative grievance 
mechanism. Recall that grievance mechanisms are part of a package of engagement 
tools. In many projects, local elites are provided more and better information about 
the project; elites end up being the primary repositories of information about the 
project. And because they have more opportunities for engagement with project 
managers, they often have the best information connections to project managers 
and employees. 
 My argument draws on insights from a randomized control trial conducted 
in Malawi.71 In this study, researchers were attempting to determine how best 
71.     Ariel BenYishay & A. Mushfiq Mobarak, Social Learning and Communication, (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20139, 2014). 
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to transmit information about new technologies or innovations to farmers in 
poor communities. The conventional approach was to use external agents to 
communicate with farmers about new technologies. Researchers tested three 
different approaches.72 In the first, government agents transmitted the information 
to local farmers.73 The second relied on lead farmers to transmit information to 
local farmers. Lead farmers were selected because they were better educated and 
had more resources than typical local farmers.74 The final approach relied on peer 
farmers, selected because they were members of the target community, and because 
they had similar experiences and needs as the rest of the population.75 
 Researchers found that peer farmers were, under the appropriate conditions, 
more effective.76 Researchers concluded that peer farmers were more effective 
because: (1) they educated themselves about the new technology or method and did 
a good job of learning its relevant features; (2) they were very persuasive to other 
farmers, especially those who were similarly situation; (3) they communicated 
effectively with the target audience; and (4) they adopted the new technologies 
themselves, creating a demonstration effect.77 
 This research suggests that it might be possible to transform the grievance 
mechanism into something more like a “problem identification and resolution 
process.”78 This might be done by assigning roles to members of the community, 
which might be more effective than simply opening the doors to the grievance 
process and awaiting complaints. To accomplish this, the project would enlist 
members of the community to work as monitors of various aspects of the project. 
For example, farmers whose fields were near a pipeline could be invited to monitor 
the soil and water quality as a way to identify leaks or spills. Traders could monitor 
road conditions to ensure that increased use of roads by those associated with 
the project did not degrade road conditions. Others could be enlisted to monitor 
the receipt of benefits from the project to local government officials or the like. 
Regardless of the role, the point would be to assign members of the community to 
roles before any complaints or grievances arise, with the twin goals of preventing 
small problems from becoming larger problems and generating trust and good will 
to facilitate the resolution of the inevitable grievances.
72.     Id. at 7−10.
73.     Id. at 7.
74.     Id. at 7−8.
75.     Id. at 8.
76.     Id. at 2. Interestingly, peer farmers were not more effective when asked to do the task 
for free. But when given even a small monetary incentive, the peer farmers were more effec-
tive than the other methods. Id. 
77.     Id. at 1−2, 23−24.
78.     To be sure, I do not suggest that there is no place for a grievance mechanism. It is im-
perative that any project has a legitimate, accessible, and reliable dispute resolution mecha-
nism. My argument is that the dispute resolution component of the community engagement 
process should be small and not take center stage. 
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 Insights from this research might be applied to SEPs in several ways. 
One of the most important conclusions is that effective communication requires a 
connection. Farmers were slower to take new information from government agents 
or prosperous, educated farmers. The fact that these two groups were presumably 
knowledgeable about the new technology and were in possession of accurate 
information about its use and benefits was not enough to convince the target 
community to try it. Instead, targeted farmers were more receptive to new technology 
when there was some connection to the person describing it.79 Consider this in the 
context of SEPs. The new grievance process that accompanies a development project 
is like a new technology—untried by those being encouraged to use it, different 
from the norm, and pushed by powerful entities. Project managers should enlist 
local peers to be involved with the project’s governance mechanisms, including the 
grievance process, as a way of making it more accessible to all of its intended users. 
This would also help alleviate the problems that arise when a community member’s 
first meaningful encounter with the project is a confrontation. If peers were already 
involved with the project’s governance mechanisms, then other members of the 
community would likely be more willing to engage with the process. 
 This research, and other studies, suggests that enlisting community 
members in a “problem identification and resolution process” might help mitigate 
or reduce the problem of elite capture. Elite capture occurs when members of the 
community use existing social power, status, wealth, or relationships to dominate 
the new process. Elite capture can have a number of negative effects. It can 
reinforce existing social hierarchies, which is problematic when those hierarchies 
disempower women, minorities, or poor people. Elite capture can also have the 
effect of distorting a project, bending its benefits toward elites and away from less 
powerful members of the community. When the goal is to alleviate poverty, then 
those who are poorest should receive the most benefits, broadly speaking. If elites 
distort this goal, then those most in need will not receive benefits and the program 
will be less effective than it might have otherwise been. Elite capture can also 
distort a project in a different way—by depriving the project of the insights, local 
knowledge, and preferences of a wide swath of the community.
 Development policymakers often encounter the problem of how best to 
improve the quality of services provided by the project, and thereby improve the 
outcomes that the services are designed to produce. To see the problem, and an 
innovative and instructive solution, consider recent research from Uganda. There, 
the general question was to determine why so many people continued to suffer 
from diseases that could be easily prevented or treated using “a small set of proven, 
inexpensive services.”80 One possible answer to this question was that the intended 
79.     BenYishay & Mobarak, supra note 71, at 24.
80.     Martina Björkman & Jakob Svensson, Power to the People: Evidence from a Random-
ized Field Experiment on Community-Based Monitoring in Uganda, 124 Q.j. econ. 735, 735 
(2009). For description of the research design and implementation, see id. at 736–41.
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beneficiaries of these services—members of local communities—were unable 
to hold accountable the providers of these services, which reduced the quality 
of the services.81 The specific research question was whether “more extensive 
community-based monitoring . . . [would] increase[] effort by the health unit staff” 
in the community, and, as a result, produce better health outcomes for community 
members.82 Thus, the study’s intervention was designed to increase community 
engagement with health workers to determine if this would create an incentive for 
the workers to perform better.83 
 Most interesting and relevant for the design of SEPs is the intervention that 
researchers designed and found to be effective. To enhance community participation, 
researchers conducted extensive community surveys to determine the utilization 
of health facilities, the quality of services provided, and comparisons with other 
facilities.84 Researchers then assembled this information in report cards (in a format 
and language appropriate to the target population) and provided the report cards to 
members of the community.85 Researchers disseminated the information in the report 
cards to the community in highly interactive meetings, which included information 
about patients’ rights, and asked members of the community to arrive at an action 
plan for improving health services.86 Later, some members of the community who 
had participated in this process met with health workers, and together they arrived 
at a “community contract” covering a number of issues, including how community 
members could monitor the health workers.87 After a year, researchers found 
“large increases in utilization and improved health outcomes.”88 They also found 
“communities became more involved in monitoring” providers89 and the amount of 
effort put forth by health workers.90
 An approach that engages community members in grievance processes before 
problems arise could build on these insights. Instead of relying on individuals to bring 
claims when they were sufficiently disgruntled, SEPs might prescribe monitoring roles 
81.     Id. at 735–36. 
82.     Id. at 740, 744. 
83.     The researchers relied on two important hypotheses that are worth noting, but are not 
directly relevant to understanding how the study’s results might inform SEPs. First, research-
ers hypothesized that health worker effort would improve health outcomes. Second, research-
ers hypothesized that health worker effort could be influenced by community monitoring 
and engagement, as opposed to pecuniary rewards for health workers, institutional sanctions 
against workers who exerted too little effort, or other factors. Id. at 739–40. 
84.     Id. at 740–41.
85.     Id. at 741–42. 
86.     Id. at 741–43.
87.     Id. at 743.
88.     Id. at 735, 767. 
89.     Id. at 748. It is important to note that, although researchers had a high degree of confi-
dence in this finding, it was based on an assortment of evidence including reports from com-
munity organizations and surveys.
90.     Id. at 748−52.
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to members of the community as a way to engage more participation. This would 
likely have the effect of mitigating the potential effects of elite capture. Consider 
what would occur if community members were enlisted to perform monitoring 
functions: If the project merely opens its doors and declares that anyone can bring 
a grievance while engaging with local elites on other issues, then local elites are the 
only members of the community with formal connections to the project, thereby 
replicating their existing social power with respect to the new project. If, instead, 
members of the community were enlisted to perform monitoring roles with regard 
only to their ability to actually perform the function and not to their social status or 
power, then a person’s existing social power would not predict his or her role in the 
new process. Members of the community would not assume that their existing social 
role, or lack of social power, would determine how their grievance would be treated, 
or whether their voice would be heard and taken seriously. 
 There is an additional insight from the Uganda study that bears on this issue. 
One of its findings is that community members need information in order to effectively 
interact with local institutions.91 That much is not surprising. What is significant is the 
evidence that information alone is not enough. It is important to provide information 
in a format that local people can understand. More significantly, if information is to be 
of any value, local people must have that information and have access to mechanisms 
that allow them to put the information to use. Without a means to use the information, 
it is not at all clear that the information itself is of much value to local citizens. 
 Before moving on, it is important to address one potential objection. One 
of the fears of those involved in the SEP process is that enhancing a grievance 
mechanism will cause an increase in the number and seriousness of claims. This 
“claims generation” problem can be a reason to make it difficult to use a grievance 
mechanism. Creating a new forum is thought to generate additional, and perhaps 
weaker, claims that will be costly to adjudicate and a nuisance to the company. This 
concern, though plausible, is unlikely. Instead, the grievance process should be 
normalized and conceived as a process by which to address issues that arise, rather 
than as a formal, court-like structure in which to pick who wins or loses an existing 
and difficult dispute. It may well turn out to be true that such a grievance process 
addresses more initial claims, but I would expect that these claims will be smaller, 
easier to resolve, and ultimately less costly to the relationship between the project’s 
proponents and those affected by it. The best metaphor might be to the use of health 
services. If all health services are costly, then people will only go to the doctor when 
there is a substantial problem. Alternatively, it might be better to reduce the costs of 
fitness programs, preventative care, and care provided by nurses. In this model, the 
total number of people who use health services might rise, but the overall cost and 
complexity of the entire system might be lower. This analogy is imperfect, to be sure, 
but the idea of making it easier to quickly address small issues is promising.
91.     Id. at 766. 
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 2.   Information Flow
 
 A separate but closely related problem has to do with the ways that 
information flows between members of the community and the proponents and 
managers of a development project. One of the principal arguments in favor of 
stakeholder engagement is that community participation will help to increase the 
benefits flowing to the community. In the development literature, there are two 
plausible mechanisms by which this might happen. First, community members 
exert influence on the details of the project such as where the project will be located, 
where necessary inputs such as water or energy will come from, and similar issues. 
The theory is that community influence can help identify potential problems and 
push the final project closer to a shape that is more consistent with community 
values or, at the very least, avoid or mitigate some of the worst potential harms. 
The second avenue through which community might influence the project is to 
decrease the likelihood of corruption. On this theory, community members might 
serve as watchdogs to ensure that the company, local government, and other actors 
fulfill their promises. This theory relates to the problem of elite capture in that 
the involvement of members of the community might serve as a sort of check on 
elites—or others—tempted to take more than their share of the project’s benefits. 
 The problem of how best to engage an affected community is one that arises 
frequently in economic development work, and it is one that has been the subject of 
some evaluation. Much of the time, the process of community engagement means 
that the project’s proponents and managers provide information to members of 
the community and remain receptive to community input. This approach assumes 
that the information is provided in a form that members of the community will 
understand and, in time, allow community members to digest and respond to the 
information. Most development projects also assume that enhanced community 
involvement, by itself, will serve as a check on many forms of corruption, namely 
those involving other members of the community or local government. 
 There have been a number of RCTs seeking to determine how best to involve 
members of an affected community in development decisions. One of the key 
findings is that community involvement does not necessarily reduce the incidence 
of corruption, and there is evidence to support the inference that community 
involvement, when it takes the form of receiving information and responding to 
that information, does not necessarily improve the project.
 One of the problems with the information flow processes in many SEPs 
is that they implicitly assume that local governments—likely to be controlled 
by existing elites—are adequate representatives of the local community.92 There 
92.     See Robert Goodland, Free, Prior and Informed Consent and the World Bank Group, 
4 sustAInABle dev. l & pol’y 66, 68 (2004) (noting that “it is essential that truly legitimate 
representatives [of affected communities] be sought and involved . . . rather than the usual 
easier-to-identify village elites”). 
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is substantial evidence that local governments should not be considered proxies 
for local communities.93 Some local governments are unrepresentative, some are 
controlled by individuals who wish to enrich themselves, and most are simply too 
small to adequately represent the diversity of viewpoints and experiences of real 
communities.94 In addition, the Malawi study95 highlights another problem with 
treating local governments as proxies. If true, as it appears from the Malawi study, 
local citizens absorb new information best when they have some connection to the 
person sharing the information. If companies transmit information to local people 
through the local government, then there is a risk that people do not absorb it any 
meaningful way. Again, enlisting citizens to play a role in the project, even if just 
as dispersers of information, might mitigate this risk. 
 A closely related problem with many SEPs is that those associated with 
the project assume that information flows best through existing, formal networks. 
Local governance structures are one example of such networks, but many projects 
rely on local civic organizations as well.96 As with reliance on local government, the 
use of formal organizations can be inadequate. When outreach is done in this top-
down, formalized way, there is little use of existing non-formal networks. Members 
of all communities are also members of any number of networks, and they receive
93.     Some of the most powerful and telling evidence comes from recent, innovative studies 
of corruption. See, e.g., Ritva Reinikka & Jakob Svensson, Local Capture: Evidence from a 
Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda, 119 Q.j. econ. 679 (2004). In that study, 
the authors surveyed 250 primary schools to determine the extent to which funds from an 
education grant from the central government to local schools actually reached the schools. 
Researchers discovered that on average, “schools received only 13 percent of central govern-
ment spending” on education programs. Id. at 680. They found that “[t]he bulk of the grants 
was captured by local government officials (and politicians).” Id. Local government officials, 
the nominal representatives of the targeted community, instead enriched themselves. Id. at 
681. Interestingly, the same researchers also concluded that Uganda was far from unique. 
Indeed, in “four out of the five educational programs” funded similarly in other countries in 
Africa, “local capture [was] a serious problem.” Id. at 698. 
94.     See Goodland, supra note 92, at 68 (noting that “it has been common practice for pro-
ponents [of a development project] to latch onto a certain representative and deal only with 
them” instead of broadly engaging the affected population).
95.     See BenYishay & Mobarak, supra note 71.
96.     See, e.g., Anne M. Larson & Jesse C. Ribot, Democratic Decentralization Through a 
Natural Resources Lens: An Introduction, 16 euro. j. dev. res. 1, 6, 18 (2004) (describing 
the problems that result when local institutions, including NGOs and civil society organiza-
tions, are incorrectly assumed to be representative and capable of receiving and administering 
substantial power over development projects or funds).
54
   Spring 2015                        Evidence-Based Stakeholder Engagement
information through myriad sources.97 Treating informational or social networks as 
fixed or formalized is likely a mistake. One implication of the Malawi research is 
that those proposing a new technology should think like pollinators: introduce the 
technology to members of the community, rely on them to distribute it through their 
own non-formal networks, and only manipulate the process to the extent necessary 
to ensure that the pollinators have an incentive to do their work. 
conclusIon
 When proponents of large-scale development projects work with affected 
communities to develop a stakeholder engagement plan, the result should be 
something that addresses the issues that will arise as well as possible. As I have 
argued, there is an emerging body of research that suggests that the current 
provisions of many stakeholder engagement plans may not reflect the best possible 
approaches to solving the problems that the plans are designed to solve. Because 
stakeholder engagement plans address issues that are critically important to poor 
people in developing countries, scholars and advocates should apply lessons from 
existing research, and develop research projects that directly investigate stakeholder 
engagement in real communities affected by real projects.
97.     For an analysis of the contributions of informal networks to governance and economic 
activity, see Kate Meagher, Informal Economies and Urban Governance in Nigeria: Popular 
Empowerment or Political Exclusion?, 54 AFr. stud. rev. 47 (2011). In addition to a theo-
retical discussion of the roles of informal networks, the author documents the contribution of 
informal networks to economic activity in three areas in Nigeria. Id. at 52−56. To be clear, the 
results do not support the claim that local, informal networks are in all cases better than other 
governance mechanisms. Instead, the point is that informal networks are vibrant and impor-
tant components in the lives of people in all communities, including communities targeted by 
development programs, and to ignore them is unwise.
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